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Anti-Social, Inside-Out 
by Samuel Solomon 
 
[An extract from Chapter 4 of Samuel Solomon (2019), Lyric Pedagogy and Marxist-Feminism: 
Social Reproduction and the Institutions of Poetry, published in the series Bloomsbury Studies 
in Critical Poetics (ed. Daniel Katz). Reprinted with permission from Bloomsbury.] 
 
In her second book of critical prose, Am I That Name?: Feminism and the Category of ‘Women’ 
in History (1988), Denise Riley tracks the historical oscillations, in feminist and proto-
feminist movements, between claims for and disavowals of the name ‘women’. The book 
asks how ‘women’ — as a name and as language — has interacted and will continue to 
interact with feminist political formations as both an irritant and a necessity. The book’s 
argument is that such shifts and mutations are not aberrant but rather endemic to 
feminism’s multifaceted relationship to the category ‘women’ in the first place. Riley’s goal 
is not simply to insist on the real heterogeneity of women, as if the category ‘women’ 
contained an empirical mass, however variable, but rather to show that the category itself 
amasses and gathers forces that sometimes do violence to those who call themselves or find 
themselves called ‘women’; so, as she writes, 
The risky elements to the processes of alignment in sexed ranks are never 
far away, and the very collectivity which distinguishes you may also be 
wielded, even unintentionally, against you. Not just against you as an 
individual, that is, but against you as a social being with needs and 
attributions. (1988: 17) 
 
There is a clear continuity between this kind of claim and those found in Riley’s first book 
of prose, War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother (1983). In the earlier text, Riley 
showed how invocations of ‘mothers’ often elide the actual needs of those who find 
themselves called ‘mothers’. Similarly, Riley in 1988 argues that feminists must navigate 
the twin threats of responding and not responding to a misinterpellation: to refuse, to say 
‘no, we are not women’ risks being utterly unintelligible and being swept up along with the 
attribution that was presupposed in the first place, whereas even canny affirmations of 
‘women’ can be appropriated to underwrite rather than transform the troubling operations 
of the category (1988: 112). The tactic that Riley proposes, in light of this oscillating threat, 
is a politics of irony as a working from within that may or may not be audible, even to its 
speakers, who will never control the historicity of the classifications that they repeat or 
refuse. 
 
Many readers of Riley’s poetry and prose have taken up this emphasis on irony as political 
tactic and attempted to decide whether irony is a political good (as Riley herself sometimes 
claims) or is instead an excuse for quietism. Bypassing this pro-or-con approach, I aim to 
show that Riley’s writings more interestingly set to work the dialectics of the social and the 
antisocial, and that they do this by elaborating states of singleness and loneliness. This is the 
case across her poetry and her prose. Riley rejects an approach to poetry that assumes the 
framework of an intersubjective relation between two persons, and she provides in its place 
a rich writing of the inherent sociality of apparently solitary states. Her poetry and prose 
work to explain the reproduction of forms of experience that fall on the far side of what 
counts as ‘social’. For Riley, it is precisely the reproduction of the division between the 
social and the non-social, and the jettisoning of all questions of human need to the ‘social’ 
side, that elides the crucial question of how needs are produced and met. What is of concern 
for Riley, and for me, in much of her work is the problem of how to articulate and share 
needs that are not reducible to those attributed to people on the basis of sociological 
categories. 
 
To this end, Am I That Name? amends some of her earlier arguments from War in the 
Nursery. The most significant challenge comes in the book’s third chapter, on ‘“The 
Social”, “Women”, and Sociological Feminism’. Here, Riley tracks the development of ‘the 
social’ across the long nineteenth century in the United Kingdom, considering how ‘the 
social’ came to designate a specifically feminized sphere of human life. While War in the 
Nursery had insisted on rethinking the ‘social’ through an account of ‘socialized biology’, 
Riley now argues that the very delineation of the social must be understood as an historical 
event with particular logical consequences that cannot go unchallenged. She writes, 
Once the seemingly neutral and vacant backdrop of ‘the social’ presents 
itself for scrutiny, it appears as a strange phenomenon in its own right . . . 
[O]nce the authenticity of ‘the social’ is called into question in itself, it 
cannot function as a neutral site upon which progress or reaction may win 
the day. (1988: 49) 
 
That is, ‘the social’ has, as a category, been an agent of historical change. The frequent usage 
of ‘the social’ to name a neutral field upon which to compose feminist politics ignores this 
history, and along with it the historical and political force imposed by the delineation of 
‘the social’ itself. 
 Most significantly for Riley, ‘the social’ emerges as a doubly feminized sphere by virtue of its 
proximity to domestic life and by its subsequent openness to the virtuous interventions or 
deleterious failings of individual women, for better and for worse in the eyes of those who 
would seek to manage it (often themselves women). Riley writes, 
One of the peculiarities of ‘women’ in its proximity to ‘the social’ is a 
doubled feminisation. In so far as the concerns of the social are familial 
standards — health, education, hygiene, fertility, demography, chastity and 
fecundity — and the heart of the family is inexorably the woman, then the 
woman is also solidly inside of that which has to some degree already been 
feminised . . . One striking effect of the conceptualising of this ‘social’ is its 
dislocation of the political. (50–51) 
 
That is, the contents of the ‘social’ are already feminized in advance of their ascription to 
women’s activities, and this ascription enacts a redoubling of femininity. But it also means, 
Riley insists, that the invention of ‘the social’ was part of a ‘dislocation of the political’ 
away from the sphere of women’s participation and influence. This is part of a project of 
divorcing political thought and practice from the conditions and concerns of exploited and 
oppressed people, and particularly from the lives of women as waged and unwaged 
workers: 
The question of poverty, for instance, becomes divorced from politics and 
assigned . . . to the social sphere. The associations of ‘women’ with this 
sphere accompany a displacement and a permanent erosion of older 
distinctions between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’, at the same time as the 
constriction of the ‘political’ is refined. ‘Women’ are overwhelmingly 
sociological and therefore, given these new definitions, not political entities 
. . . The social is in this sense constructed, rather than being the universal 
agent which bathes everything else. (1988: 51) 
 
There were, then, significant obstacles to attempts by women to use ‘the social’ as a 
launching pad into political life. Indeed, as Riley writes, ‘How “women” might become 
candidates for translation from the social to the political sphere depended not only on how 
“women” were conceived, but on how the understandings of those spheres themselves were 
altered’ (1988: 55). In this sense, Am I That Name? supplements Riley’s thinking of 
‘socialized biology’ (developed in War in the Nursery) by unpacking further the 
contradictions that are historically embedded in ‘the social’, such as the tenuous divorcing 
of women from the political by way of the supposedly non-political nature of the social. 
 
All of this amounts to a project to transform ‘the social’ by thinking about how and when 
refusals to assent to sociological categories might have some cumulative effect upon the 
constitution of the division between the social, where marked identities would be placed, 
and the political. I am arguing that Riley works at this desired reconfiguration of the 
‘social’ by elaborating seemingly asocial or antisocial experiences and relations. In her 
poetry and prose from the late 1980s to the present day, Riley elaborates loneliness and 
singleness as political wedges against the enforcement of feminized sociality. Her writing 
approaches tenuously social forms of loneliness and non-belonging dialectically, in order to 
counter the reproduction of the division between the social and the antisocial, a 
distinction that tends to sever questions of social reproduction from the activity of politics. 
 
I’ll illustrate this with a glance at one of Riley’s more surprising poems, ‘Curmodgeonly’. 
The poem’s long lines extend across the wide pages of Riley’s 2000 Selected Poems, forming 
a ragged margin at the right edge of the page. In spite of this unusual lineation, 
‘Curmudgeonly’ is basically a mini-prose-essay decrying the use of the term ‘partner’ in 
reference to the couple form. It is an alternately wry and impassioned critique of ‘partner’. 
But the poem’s title also undercuts the seriousness of its own critique by announcing itself 
as ‘curmudgeonly’ — as holding a grudge and emitting a grumble — and, in any event, as 
coming from someone who finds themselves behind or just outside of the times. In this 
sense, not only the content but also the species of the critique — the characterization of itself 
as ‘curmudgeonly’ — is flamboyantly and recalcitrantly antisocial. The poem grouses about 
‘partner’s’ lexical trendiness: 
           This maybe is my soured reaction; but I only mean 
If you’ve a private contract to describe a person as your partner, junking all the shackles 
Of the state, plunged in a glow of free association — that is fine, but don’t you then set up 
An unintentional excluding coldness to the millions who through bad luck, mismanagement, 
              death or desertion, find themselves un-partnered? 
(Riley 2000a: 92) 
The seemingly anodyne use of ‘partner’, on this account, flattens out the lived material 
histories that leave people partnered or un-partnered. The effect of this flattening is that 
singleness is rendered a distasteful failure to participate in a liberal democratic institution. 
The poem doesn’t provide a satisfying alternative designation, however: 
Of course just what to call them makes you slither (like ‘the father of my youngest child’, ‘a person 
I once lived with’?) — but I can’t warm to this vogue for ‘partner’, since not to possess something 
So sober yet so mildly venturesome, so virtuously unlicensed by the state, sounds worse 
Than not being trusted in business, not being picked for even the weakest school netball team 
 
Things get better — or, anyway, more curmudgeonly — for the remainder of the poem, 
which climaxes with millenarian premonitions of a further flattening of social life: 
    Better a cheerful privacy than this partitioning pseudo-public speech 
Of two followed by two, neat and wooden as Noah’s Ark. I hear a bloodless future come 
In which we’ll sidle as usual through attachments whose truthful varieties are beaten flat 
Under one leaden word. 
 
The particular content of the antisociality of this poem’s argument lies in its rejection of a 
social democratic rhetoric of intimacy. Indeed, the poem opens, ‘A partner is a social-
democratic thing to have.’ Jokey denigrations of social democracy were always a feature of 
Riley’s writings: her work tends to understand social democracy as an approach to politics 
that is profoundly inattentive to the material foundations of the social. On her account, 
social democracy atomizes individuals on the basis of abstract categories and casts the state 
in the role of meeting the aggregate needs of individuals who have been sociologically 
subcategorized.1 Social democracy here names a political ideology that grounds its 
approach to human needs in abstracted categories and assumes the stability of crudely 
sociological designations of individual types. For Riley, this assumption of the stability of 
sociological definitions inevitably reproduces the elision of the needs of people — such needs, 
she maintains, are not readily encompassed by ascriptive practices. ‘Curmudgeonly’ is a 
performance in the face of such forms of categorization, and it places itself firmly on the 
outside of the social democratic arithmetic of partnership wherein individuals freely elect 
to add themselves together. 
 
Riley’s essay ‘The Right to Be Lonely’ revisits this same problem in an attempt to query the 
rise of ‘alternative’ forms of kinship that progressively pass for legitimate variations on ‘the 
family’; such an expansion of the family just pushes those outside of its grasp further to the 
margins. The essay’s considerations of ‘loneliness’ spring into an elaborate description of 
an ‘emotive topography’ of sociality: ‘There is an emotive topography in that spatial 
conceptualization of inclusion and exclusion; it is this linguistic emotionality which 
suffuses all political philosophies of who is in and who is left out’ (2005: 50–51). 																																																								
1 This approach also explains the ironic phrase ‘the social democracy of loneliness’ that 
shows up in her long poem, ‘A Shortened Set’ (2000a: 41) 
According to this argument, the unavoidable fact of spatial rhetoric produces and 
reproduces a structurally necessary affect of loneliness among those falling both inside and 
outside of new definitions of the family. 
 
In contrast to the pervasive figuration of loneliness as cut off from or outside of the social, 
Riley challenges her reader to imagine loneliness not as a non-social state but rather as the 
social form adhering to those who refuse or who are refused the call of socially legitimate 
affiliation that finds its form in the word ‘family’. Riley writes, 
But there’s a stronger solitude which refuses to be understood as merely 
presocial and which rejects the benevolent will to make everything, and it 
too, familial. This solitude has no time for any plangency about its own 
‘exclusion.’ Indeed, it groans at the prospect of being tenderly ushered into 
the domain of the new social . . . How might such singleness neither be 
considered pathological nor be swept up, in an ostentatious 
depathologizing, into a compulsive sociability? (2005: 58) 
 
This loneliness refuses to endorse the language of inside and outside, and with it the affect 
attendant to all talk of inclusion and exclusion that a ‘social democratic’ understanding of 
loneliness might entail. Such singleness rejects ‘compulsive sociability’ but is not for that 
reason asocial; the refusal is part of a dialectical relationship that is within, so to speak, the 
social, insofar as the social is the institution of a division between the social and the non-
social.2 
																																																								
2 In this sense, Riley’s interest in loneliness might have an analogue in Fred Moten and 
Stefano Harney’s poetics of the ‘undercommons’, wherein they explain that the 
‘professionalism’ of the academy declares itself at war with the asocial, working to root out 
and forcibly socialize ‘the undercommons’. They reject professionalism’s declaration of 
war: ‘it is professionalization itself that is devoted to the asocial, the university itself that 
reproduces the knowledge of how to neglect sociality in its very concern for what it calls 
asociality.’ Against this, the opposite of professionalization is the ‘fugitive impulse’: ‘not 
 Here Riley insists on the political need for a singleness that places itself neither outside nor 
inside of the social. The essay closes, 
Might a properly recognized state of singleness (to wrench the notion of 
‘recognition’ away from its usual oppressively gregarious tone) recast that 
desolate and resentment-prone metaphoricity of social exclusion — and 
might it also somewhat allay the burden, or at least the embarrassed self-
reproach, of those who may find themselves effectively living in solitude at 
the very same time as they live inside the family? (2005: 58) 
 
‘The Right to Be Lonely’ picks up the contradictions that animated Riley’s earlier writings 
on the social and on motherhood and the category of ‘women’, but it focuses its 
investigation of such contradictions on the spatialization of language and on metaphor. 
This spatiality is a complex reflection of social contradiction. As Riley writes, ‘I’m not 
inside anything. I’m not outside it, either. Yet the public/private distinction, which has 
such solid realities in its effects, tends in its topographical conceptualization to underwrite 
the affective metaphoricity of inner and outer. This cuts many ways’ (2005: 54). 
 
This is one of many passages from Riley’s prose that reuses lines from her own poems, in 
this case from a poem that likewise worries at the barrier between inside and outside. 
‘Knowing in the Real World’, a poem first published in 1993, includes the following line: 
‘I’m not outside anything: I’m not inside it either’ (2000a: 53). Here, the problem seems to 
be one of lyric expression: what is being rejected is the idea that poetic expression involves a 
unidirectional movement from the private inside to the public outside. The poem, 
constructed in couplets with regular line-length, has, up to this point, described a day’s 																																																																																																																																																																					
asocial but against the social . . . this is what disturbs and at the same time forms the 
undercommons against the university’ (Harney and Moten 2013: 40). 
changing colours and textures as if looking out a window. The day also moves in and out 
upon itself: ‘One afternoon hour burns away until a rust-/coloured light sinks in towards 
evening.’ The poem then, itself, turns quickly ‘inward’: 
or any time at all when I fall straight through 
myself to thud as onto the streaked floor of 
a swimming pool drained out for winter, no 
greeny depths but lined in blackened leaves. 
The assertion that ‘I’m not outside anything: I’m not inside it either’, which comes next, 
torques this dirty pastoral interior, and a demonstratively social language irrupts into the 
poem’s withdrawn reflections: 
I’m not outside anything: I’m not inside it either. 
There’s no democracy in beauty, I’m following 
human looks. Though people spin away, don’t 
be thrown by their puzzling lives, later the lives 
secrete their meaning. The red sun’s on the rain. 
Where do I put myself, if public life’s destroyed. 
The question of where to place ‘myself’ among shape-shifting social relations responds to 
the faulty division between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The essay on loneliness repeats this 
aphorism (‘I’m not outside anything; I’m not inside it either’) in inverted form. In both 
cases, Riley queries the relationship between the ‘single’ self and ‘the real world’ where 
‘public life’s destroyed’. The fact that public life’s destroyed might, perhaps, be a good 
thing from the perspective of a socialist-feminist critique of the public/private divide. The 
challenge for poetics, anyway, is ‘to put myself’ somewhere without reproducing and 
reinstituting the division between the social and the antisocial. But in order to work, any 
rhetorical displacement of the border between inside and outside would have to be part of 
a strategy for social change. Such social change would have to work at abolishing the 
‘social’ as a cordoned off — and cordoning off — field so that ‘I’ might not suffer the effects 
of the social’s emotive spatiality of inside and outside. Riley’s rewriting of her own words 
amounts to a performance of antisocial experience. If this writing seems antisocial, and it 
sometimes does, that is because it retraces the reproduction of the antisocial by way of the 
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